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ABSTRACT

WWW.Privacy.gov: A Constitutional and
Legislative Review
by
Stephanie Ann M urphy
Dr. M ichael Bowers. Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Political Science
U niversity of Nevada. Las Vegas

One o f the most controversial and evolving rights recognized within recent years has
been the right to privacy. During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court and the
United States Congress recognized the existence o f this right, although in lim ited aspects.
In the twenty-first century. Americans’ privacy rights have clashed with the evolution
and the use of the Internet. Complications between a person’ s privacy and the
inform ation needed for national security interests arose. The follow ing study examines
the question o f where the privacy o f an individual in this new era ends and where
government intrusion begins. Through a qualitative analysis, constitutional and
legislative aspects w ill be brought forth to challenge the idea that self-regulation is
feasible within the growing cyber nation. Final analysis w ill bring forward new policy
proposals to counter current problems in this virtual world.

Ill
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IN TR O D U C T IO N

TH E IN TE R N E T
Since the II'*’ o f September 2001, accusations o f government law enforcement and
intelligence agencies spying on citizens as w ell as observations about legislators’ and the
constituents’ lack o f involvement in current policy outcomes have become major issues
to many users o f the Internet, who refer to themselves as “ Netizens.” The right to privacy
in this inform ation era has become one o f the most controversial issues today. Yet in the
wake o f the terrorist attacks on America, this unstable right has become more precarious
than ever before. Questions o f where the government can intrude have been raised.
However, w ith legislation such as the USA P A TR IO T AC T and programs such as
DCS 1000, one must ask whether there is a protected constitutional right to privacy, and if
so. who or what w ill protect that right?
This thesis examines the problems that American Netizens face on the Internet in the
aspect o f privacy. Chapter One addresses the history o f the Internet as w e ll as the
growing problems o f government encroachment on citizens’ privacy rights. Chapter Tw o
discusses the Supreme Court’ s rulings on whether or not government has the ability to
impose electronic surveillance on the citizens’ constitutional right to privacy from
government intrusion. The third chapter reveals Congress’s decisions on the growing
privacy problems in respect to new technology. In addition, it w ill also address the USA
PA TR IO T AC T. The final chapter is a summary o f the preceding chapters and answers

1
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the question of whether or not the government believes that American Netizens have a
right to privacy on the Internet. In addition, some proposals w ill be given to address the
question o f who w ill protect the Netizens’ rights.
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CHAPTER I

W ELC O M E TO TH E JUN G LE
The Internet is a mysterious word that conjures up ideas o f digital or laser wires
interlinking and overlapping one another, spanning across the ether o f virtual space to
lin k human interactions between numerous people. Fantasy images of this network,
created by mad scientists, are epitomized in movies such as “ Tron,” “ Hackers," and “ The
N et" which create an environment that pits the good against the bad hackers.' The idea
o f the Internet has become romanticized in today's world. Yet very few people who
interact and use the Internet know what its capabilities are, and what the dangers are that
hide beneath its surface. M ost people, until recently, believed the Internet was a safe
haven for many who wished to enter a new unknown world. However, with modem
technology, this is all changing, and the users’ privacy becomes more o f an issue than
ever before.
W hile the word Internet (National Information Infrastructure- N il) seems innocent,
there are many untold dangers that await those who have yet to travel the wrong cyber

' “ Hacker ” is a term that denotes a person who attempts to gain unauthorized access to a
system, but does not seek to do any damage. It also refers to computer users who
experiment with computer programs to test their limits. A “ cracker ” is a term that has
been proposed to refer to computer criminals, who unethically and illegally obtain access
into systems. (Meyer and Baber 1997, 8-7)
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road in this digital world."

Every day, m illions o f people around the world turn on their

computers and log onto an Internet Service Provider (ISP), which w ill allow them to
access the W orld Wide Web (web). People access their bank accounts, talk to or e-mail
their friends and fam ily, go shopping, plan trips, watch movies, listen to music, and read
the news through the N il. Some people access inform ation on their representatives and
pending legislation, sending electronic mail messages (e-m ail) to state and federal
representatives. In some states, one can even cast his o r her ballot in elections instead o f
taking the trip down to the polls. Nowadays people even w ork at home, submitting their
w ork through e-mail to their companies, or they run small businesses using a web site.
W hile the advantages o f the Internet are seen on a daily level, there still are many dangers
or possible dangers that users face when interacting w ith others.
As one can see from the previous list o f Internet interactions, one of the chief dangers
in this new society is that o f releasing too much inform ation about one’ s self allowing
one’ s privacy to erode, even i f indirectly. People argue that companies are becoming too
inquisitive, asking too many personal questions, or g iving out too much information
about individuals. Yet people are still w illing to submit their information to an unknown
other, without asking questions. People seem to forget about him or herself as an
individual and his or her protected rights. Moreover, there are still many who have
forgotten that people are not the only factor involved in today’ s world, computers also
play a huge role as well as the government and its interactions. Perhaps, by taking a look
at the government and its relationship to the Internet, as w ell as how the Internet has

■ Some analysts o f the Internet refer to the Internet as the National Information
Infrastructure (N il), and the proposed Information Superhighway as the Global
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evolved, one can see the attempts made to erode the individual’ s newfound privacy
right.-

The Birth o f a New W orld
The history o f privacy on the Internet is a rather short one when compared to
traditional rights such as the right to protect one’ s property or the freedom to practice
one’s religion. In 1969, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was contracted
to connect four university computer labs; U C LA . Stanford, UCSB. and the University of
Utah. The experiment was to provide a “ communications network that would work even
i f some o f the sites were destroyed by nuclear attack. I f the most direct route was not
available, routers w ould direct traffic around the network via alternative routes.’’ (Howe
1998, 3) The network was also to facilitate cooperation between several research sites
and eventually the m ilita ry, as w ell as ensure the physical security o f the data and
information available on the system. (Barrett 1996, 21) The experiment proved a
success; so between the end o f December 1969 and by June o f 1970, four additional
institutions decided to become a part o f the network. (Howe 1998, 3)
The 1970s brought additional institutions online. The ARPA-established network had
been dubbed AR PA N ET, and N A S A , a m ilitary space program, had joined the ranks o f
institutions involved in this growing computer infrastructure. (Barrett 1996. 22; Howe
1998. 3) A t this time, commercial interests in A R P A N E T did not exist. AR PANET was

Information Infrastructure (G Il). 1 shall be using these terms interchangeably throughout
the text.
■ Chapter Two discusses the birth and history o f this right.
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dedicated to pure research and information, and monitored through the government
agency ARPA. By the m id 1970s the basic foundations for the Internet had been
established, but due to the complex computer languages involved, it was very d iffic u lt to
access. In 1979, Usenet, a private institution, created a newsgroup system that was based
upon a 1978 Unix to Unix Copy Protocol. Essentially, the newsgroup system allowed
different users from different sites to access topic specific discussion groups. The
significant aspect was that it established early community building on a network, even
though at the time it was still not a part o f the Internet due to differing programming
architecture. These network communities would create the base foundations for the
community o f Internet users who would call themselves Netizens. (Howe 1998, 3)
By 1980. the network had grown unbelievably large, and so a portion called M ILN E T
broke o ff* The United States Defense Department adopted this communication network,
but stipulated that there needed to be a way to connect both m ilitary and research
networks in the future. The Defense Research Projects Agency (DARP.A) undertook the
task o f connecting both networks to create D A R P A Internet or D AR PAN ET.
DARPANET would eventually be referred to as the Internet. (Barrett 1996, 22)
A t the same time D A R P A was linking research and m ilitary networks, private
corporations began to start their own networks. One o f the first created was termed
BITNET, referring to “ Because its [sic] Time Network.” (Howe 1998,4) B IT N E T was
connected to the IB M mainframes in the educational community around the w orld to
provide mail services, as w e ll as discussion groups sim ilar to those designed by Usenet.

M IL N E T is the m ilita ry communications network.
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In 1983, the D ARPA Internet was universally accepted and adopted on a national
level. By then, commands became easier for the normal person to access and learn. This
opened up the Internet to multi-department usage in universities. Prior to 1983.
departments in computer science and physics were some o f the few departments that had
the technological know-how to access the information. By the mid-1980s gateways had
been developed to connect B IT N E T w ith the Internet. This provided not only the
exchange o f e-mail, but also linked the discussion groups so educational facilities could
communicate in real time as w ell. (Howe 1998. 3-4) Unfortunately, w ith the increase in
university additions the Internet sites started to become unmanageable.
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the National Science Foundation (NSF) assuming
D A R P A ’ s governing role. W ith the responsibility o f governing the Internet also came an
additional duty to create a gateway fo r the United Kingdom ’ s Joint Academic Network
(JANET)^ to the Internet. A t this time, the first attempts were made to index the
Internet.^ In addition, one o f the prime groundbreaking inventions on the Internet was
created. T im Bemers-Lee at the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN) made
the Internet easier to use by creating hypertext. (Howe 1998, 5) Hypertext allows a user
to access another remote site by clickin g on a specific underlined or highlighted topiclinked word. (Meyer and Baber 1997, 5-7) This invention w ould eventually link various
chat sites as well as additional inform ational sites to a specific topic discussed on one

^ Sim ilar to ARPANET, this educational network linked the U K ’ s finest universities.
^ The first archiver o f the Internet was Peter Deutsch from M c G ill University in
Montreal. He created a program that would read the FTP (file transfer protocol) sites,
and named this program Archie. Eventually other archivers, such as Jughead and
Veronica would be created after Archie was terminated. (Howe 1998, 4-5)
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web page, thus allow ing users to easily and quickly access interest-related materials and
discussions.
In July 1992, the first national commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP), Delphi,
was permitted to open its electronic mail system to the public. Four months later all
government imposed commercial limitations on Internet use had disappeared, making the
Internet available to a variety o f commercial interests. (Howe 1998, 5-6; Barrett 1996,
23)
The year 1995 saw the end o f government control o f American institutions on the
Internet as the NSF released its sponsorship o f the N il to the privatized ISPs, such as the
newly created America O nline (A G L), Prodigy, and CompuServe. This private control
allowed for individuals not in the academic com munity to access the Internet through
personal computers (PCs) and dial-up modems. The ISP provided a service that allowed
home PCs access to the provider’ s supercomputers, the hosts, which would then allow the
user access to the Internet through wide area networks. This created facilities that would
be available to anyone who wished to take part in the Internet experience. (Barrett 1996,
23) In addition, the government’ s lack o f involvement facilitated the new Netizens’
feelings o f independence and unprecedented freedom.
The final and most crucial step in introducing the Internet to future Netizens was in
the 1998 release o f W indows 98. Incorporated w ith in the system was a new M icrosoft
friendly browser. This allow ed thousands o f people easy access to the Internet, where
they in turn found inform ation on a variety o f topics as w e ll as a way to meet other users
to whom they could relate. (How e 1998, 5-6) As a result, Internet communities began to
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grow, and w ith them came political awareness in establishing and defending the net
communities’ personal rights.
Through the Internet’ s history, one can see the growth o f a new world. A t one time,
government had taken an active role in the Internet. However, realizing that the Internet
had social and market potential in addition to the research and information aspect, the
government allowed private corporations to take over and make the rules. Eventually,
the government would fin d that minimal intervention in the Internet was more lucrative
to the United States’ market economy. However, the lack o f intervention also facilitated
the rise in computer crimes. As a result, after several years o f minimal government
intervention and the allowance o f private regulation through the ISPs, the U.S.
government decided, as it did with other new technology throughout the 20'*’ century, to
use the Internet as a tool to capture criminals and deviants. The idea was to eliminate the
then current private industry regulations created from the ISPs, since these case by case
created regulations failed to hinder the increasing rise in electronic crime performed by
crackers, regular enterprising criminals, and identity thieves. ("N o Place to H ide," 2001)
In addition, law enforcement agencies grew aware o f the increasing use o f electronic
bombs, often referred to as e-bombs,’ viral worms, and the discussions o f an

e-jihad.

' E-bombs can affect a system in a variety o f ways. They are usually a computer virus
attached to a file, which is sent through e-mail. The first experiences with e-bombs and
viruses were seen around 1982. Since then they have evolved from immature
programming glitches to intricate codes (macros) that have little programs w ithin that
reformat a computer’ s operating system and programs. (Buderi 1999, 34-36)
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A Backdoor In
Since September 11, 2001 the government has come down even harder on Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). Consequently, online privacy has taken a huge blow as
legislators and law enforcement agencies weigh national security against the populace’ s
privacy. The debate ranges from the continuance o f ISP self-regulation to ju dicial and
congressional sanctioned allowances o f government intervention techniques. How ever,
one o f the most disturbing and disappointing aspects to result from the security debate
after September 1 f ' ' comes from the American citizens themselves. In a Newsweek poll
taken during September 13“' and 14“’ o f 2001, "57 percent o f Americans said that they
would support eroding encryption protection to help law enforcement m onitor terrorism
suspects- even i f it might affect privacy and business practices. Thirty-nine percent were
opposed, the rest undecided.’’ (Associated Press 2001, 2) This drop in concern for privacy
would appear to suppon federal agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (C IA)
and the Federal Bureau o f Investigation (FBI), in initiating a variety o f snoop programs.
Perhaps in this new era o f American vulnerability previous debates on encryption,
DCS 1000, keystroke logging, and anonymous proxies w ill fall to the side as a result of
fears initiated through recent acts o f violence, and the government w ill be able to
intervene without restraints.*
One o f the areas in which government wishes to take a stand is in the realm o f
cryptography, or encryption. Encryption, a highly debated issue, is considered one o f the
ultimate defenses against all those who are not supposed to access the inform ation one
person sends to another. In order to use encryption, one person must have the "key ” to

* These terms w ill be discussed further in this chapter.
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encrypt a message, and the other person must have a matching “ decoder ke y" in order to
read that message. Those who send sensitive o r confidential information in
communications and transactions, such as a credit card number or physical address,
usually support encryption. In addition, encryption can be seen as a means o f personal
identification, like a signature, thus verifying that information sent from one pany to
another is legitimate. (Bennett and Grant 1999. 120) W hile terrorists and crim inals can
potentially use encryption, the current debate is whether or not encry ption is less likely to
be used by them since it w ould probably attract more attention to their communications,
which is something they do not desire.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government is seeking access to American created encryption
software, in hopes that by attaining an all access key, it can prevent crim inal events.
Unfortunately, the problem may not be so easily fixed because not all encryption
software is created o r made in the United States and the U.S. government cannot force
foreign companies to abide by their demands fo r an all access key. Furthermore, even if
the American companies provided the government w ith all access keys, w hy would a
crim inal knowingly use encryption software that law enforcement agencies had the
a b ility to read? The more lik e ly possibility is that American criminals w ould buy foreign
encryption, even i f it could be obtained only through the black market. These arguments
are sim ilar to the ones seen in the debate for and against anonymous proxies/posters and
remailers. (Associated Press 2001, 2)
Anonymous proxies, posters, and remailers are services that allow people to access
the Internet to engage in anonymous bulletin board postings and e-mail. There have been
huge debates on the ano nym ity o f remailers in the past few years. O rigina lly they were
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intended for psychological patients who were recovering from some traumatic experience
or political dissidents who feared government retribution. But in recent years, hackers
and crackers have adopted them as their sanctuary. In fact, many o f the computer e-mail
viruses released have originated from these remailers. (Buderi 1999, 36) W hile some
remailers com ply w ith governments' requests to release information on a user, most
support the users' anonymity and consequently have been shut down through court
injunctions and ISP sanctions for taking a stand to protect the anonym ity and privacy of
their members. (Anschiitz 2001,42-44; Levine 1996. 1526-1572)
One o f the big winners resulting from the current fear climate w ill be Carnivore,
recently renamed DCSIOOO.*^ Part o f a covert FBI surveillance triad known as the
"Dragon Ware Suite.” "' Carnivore is reportedly a stealthy looking black box outfitted
with a Pentium 111 containing Windows NT. which is equipped w ith "packet sniffing
software.” (Cohen 2001. 50; Meeks 2001. 1). Essentially, when the FB I has identified a
suspect w hose e-mail they wish to peruse, they acquire a court order sim ilar to a phone
wiretap and take Carnivore out o f storage from Quantico, Virginia. Then w orking in
conjunction w ith the ISPs, who are under court order to comply and keep quiet about it,
the program is installed into the network fo r the FBI. Once installed. Carnivore searches
through e-mail tra ffic for a name, looking at "T o ” and "From” lines, IP addressees, and

' The renaming o f Carnivore has to do w ith the negative implications o f the name. While
the program was named for "getting to the meat” o f the information, the sinister name
caused many complaints among online users. As a result, this FBI program was renamed
to take away the creepy connotation. (Cohen 2001, 50)
"Dragon Ware Suite is more than sim ply an e-mail snooping program: it ’ s capable o f
reconstructing the web surfing trail of someone under investigation... [It can) reconstruct
web pages exactly as a surveillance target saw them while surfing the Web...Besides
Carnivore, the Dragon Ware Suite includes programs called Packeteer’ and
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keywords in the header or the body o f the e-mail. According to the FBI. the software is
“ designed to spy w ith ‘ surgical’ precision on specific individuals.” (Cohen 2001. 50) (See
APPENDIX I I I to find more inform ation on Carnivore.)
For obvious reasons, critics" o f Carnivore debate the merits o f this program, stating
that it endangers our society and our freedoms in allowing fo r the possibility o f the
Internet m orphing into a massive surveillance system. Yet. the other side o f the argument
is that it allows law enforcement agencies to crack down on drug trafficking and other
illegal activities. The pros and cons o f the debate are strong on both sides; yet what
critics usually forget is that the inform ation the FBI can acquire tru ly depends on the kind
of court order that the agency obtains. Court orders usually issued allow for the FBI to
acquire e-mail addresses in a form that resemble those of a "pen-register” or a "tap-andtrace.” which allow law enforcement agencies to get phone numbers o ff a telephone
line.'" However, in order for the FBI to gain the fu ll substance o f the e-mail, a full-blown
content wiretap is required, which the courts are far less w illin g to provide. (Cohen 2001,
50)
Moreover, critics worry about the possibility o f the FBI misusing its "tap-and traces”
as well as "pen-registers.” The government contends that these lim ited wiretaps entitle
them only to the e-mail headers, yet some critics state that to obtain access to even the
header, the F B I should have to meet the same high standards required for a content

‘Coolminer.’ ... These data programs are used to reconstruct the raw data scooped up in
the initial phase by Carnivore.” (Meeks 2001, 2)
" The Follow ing are some o f the critics o f the Carnivore program; c iv il libertarians;
John Perry B arlow , co founder o f the Electric Freedom Foundation; and Lee Tien, senior
staff attorney w ith the Electronic Freedom Foundation.
'" A "tap-and-trace” allows police to record the phone numbers a suspect dials. "Penregisters” let the police log the phone numbers o f incoming calls. (Cohen 2001, 50)
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wiretap.'-’ In addition, reviewers o f the program debate whether or not Carnivore is as
surgical as the FBI contends. The fear involves the likelihood o f the FBI downloading
information about non-targets that it may happen to intercept. The unspoken fear is that
eventually the C IA and the FBI would be able to easily build a dossier on just about
everyone. As a result, analysts would like to see legislation that requires the FBI to throw
out collected evidence that is not involved in the investigation. Another possibility is that
once the investigation is over, rather than storing the acquired information in a permanent
database, purging that inform ation would be obligatory. (Cohen 2001, 50)
However, with the current political climate seen in the United States and the media,
advocates for privacy on the Internet are finding that they are fighting an uphill battle. In
fact, the national mood may increase funding for other surveillance programs, such as the
National Security Agency's (NSA) Echelon program, which is a global wire-tapping
network. This system grew out o f the 1945 jo in t agreement to share information obtained
with the intelligence operations o f New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Very
little is known about Echelon, but in a report given by the European Parliament in July
2001. not only was its existence confirmed, but also its a b ility to intercept any telephone
conversation. Internet connection, e-mail, or worldwide fax. (Cohen 2001, 52) Like
Carnivore, it can hone in on specific words, such as "h ija c k ", "bom b” , or "jihad” to name
a few. However, it is debatable as to how effective Echelon actually is, since the system
collects up to 3 m illio n messages a minute, which then must be sorted through. Critics

Headers are the headlines in the message box that summarize the contents o f a
message.
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such as Adam Cohen contend that If this system were actually effective. September 1
would not have happened.
Echelon poses a real privacy problem in that it is a global system that intrudes
without the required ju d icia l oversight that even Carnivore must have. Moreover.
Internet traffic travels in such a way that a m ajority o f the world's e-mail and other
communiqués cross over the United States' borders and then out once again. Not only is
there concern about Echelon spying on foreign communications, but also those
communications between Americans abroad and residents, who are supposed to be
outside NSA jurisdiction. (Cohen 2001. 52)
Even w ithout the use o f DCS 1000. encryption access, anonymous proxies' help, or
Echelon, the increase o f computer forensics in the law enforcement and intelligence
fields w ill probably rise. One o f the most interesting tools currently being used is that o f
keystroke logging. Keystroke logging essentially uses a suspect's computer keyboard
against that person. Investigators secretly install hardware in the perpetrator's computer.
The device then records each and every letter a person types into his or her computer,
turning the computer into a mole for the a g e n c y .O b v io u s ly this allows officials to view
correspondence, at least from one end, as well as the prized passwords needed to unlock
encrypted messages. (Dam and Lin 1996, 49) Furthermore, i f one expands this
unsanctioned activity, privacy, anonymity, freedom o f speech, and the security o f each

" Encryption and keystroke logging are often used in Information Warfare (IW ). Other
avenues used in IW include: physical destruction o f facilities, degradation o f the
opponent's system through covertly using software and/or hardware, withdrawal o f
opponent’ s data, replacing it w ith misleading data, and using software as a mole against
the opponent. (Dam and Lin 1996,49
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American are violated ever)' time this technology is used for any reason, including the
capturing and prosecuting o f criminals.
In light o f these government intrusions, questions revolving around a citizen’s
personal privacy arise. In Chapter T w o. privacy is defined and outlined. In addition,
government intrusion into a citizen's life, and how far that intrusion may go is also
e.xamined.
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C H A P T E R II

P R IV A C Y A L L GROW N UP
Privacy in the United States has become one o f the most highly debated rights today.
W hile there are many who claim that the right to privacy is a fanciful privilege, the
proponents o f that interest hold to the idea that it. like many other rights, is inalienable.
Opponents o f privacy rights, however, have a true advantage, in that the basis for this
claim is said to be unstable. The major reason stems from the fact that, while the United
States Supreme Court and the supporters o f privacy rights derive this liberty out o f the
Constitution, there is no direct language in the document establishing the existence of
privacy.
For many people, privacy is a d ifficu lt concept to define. Legal scholars have long
debated what privacy should entail or whether it even exists in our society. As
technology improves every year, the bairiers that form erly defined private life from
public become more blurred. In addition, not only do technological enhancements create
problems in defining privacy, legislation, such as the Freedom o f Information Act, also
causes further d ifficulties. The average person would find defining privacy to an exact
meaning perplexing, i f not impossible. Yet most Americans would probably understand
privacy as some form o f secrecy kept to one’ s self. O f course, privacy entails a realm o f
human conduct that is “ no one's business," except for those players involved who hold an
immediate interest. Unfortunately, this definition can encompass a variety o f issues both

17
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in the public and private realms.*^ In a world becoming smaller each day. the exact
meaning o f privacy should be something both a layperson and a scholar can agree on.
especially in understanding legislation; otherwise there arises the risk o f conceptual
confusion between society and the elite.
Judith Wagner Decew's book. In Pursuit o f Privacv. discusses the many definitions of
privacy. Essentially, privacy is a reference to “ the separation o f spheres o f activity, limits
on governmental authority, forbidden knowledge and experience, lim ited access, and
ideas o f group membership, to name a few possibilities." (Decew 1997. 13) As one can
see. privacy encompasses a broad number o f areas: thus finding a precise definition for
privacy becomes a challenge. One possibility given is that it is the a b ility to make
independent and self-legislating choices. (Decew 1997. 40) W hile this tends to be the
major underlying idea in most constitutional cases, which usually hold some interest in
making fundamentally independent, personal decisions, the real question is whether
privacy entails more than just autonomy. The simple answer, according to the courts, is
"yes." especially in regards to electronic surveillance, which has ver\ little to do with
autonomous decision making, and more to do w ith inform al documented knowledge.'^
Privacy itself is a multifaceted concept where competing claims and values clash.
However, this discussion w ill be limited to personal inform ation acquired ille gally or
unethically through technological advances.

In respect to the law. the public realm can sometimes include damages against private
individuals, which w ould then fall under tort case law. Thus, the public realm would
consist o f whether or not the government has constitutional claims against an individual.
In reference to inform al documented knowledge, we shall also include private
electronic mail, as w ell as information about Internet surfing.
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Privacy’ s Evolution
Historically, it has been argued that the concept o f privacy existed before the
founding o f the New W orld, dating as far back as the ancient Greeks. (Decew 1997. 9-25)
Examples o f the notion o f privacy can be taken from philosophers such as Aristotle. The
p olis, as A ristotle discussed, was a structured politica l sphere where government and the

city-state prevailed. By nature, man was a politica l creature and thus suited to participate
in the political realm. Yet for Aristotle, in order fo r each man to hold an enviable status
in the polis, he must first be master o f his own private sphere, or oikos. The oikos
involved the private household, or home, and the fam ily life. This included concepts
such as reproduction, birth, death, and other activities, which were either religious or
what was “ deemed individual,” areas that were not available for public governance.
(Decew 1997, 10; Swanson 1992 2-4) As one can see, the concept o f oikos versus the
p o lis is just the beginning o f a long debate regarding communal interests against that of

the individual.
In the United States, scholars contend that the Founding Fathers had intended for
citizens to have some form o f privacy when they wrote the T h ir d a n d Fourth’**
Amendments to the Constitution. (Scott 1995, 32-33) Furthermore, the additions o f the
F ir s t , F if t h , '” and Ninth Amendments,*' “ demonstrated an awareness that governments

“ No soldier shall, in time o f peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the Owner, nor in time o f war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”
”* “ The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
“ Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, o r prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom o f speech, or of the press; or the right of
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could threaten the privacy and integrity o f each person and o f his or her religious
practice, speech, association, home, and personal possessions.” (Strum 1998, 197) The
origins o f these amendments derived from the idea that each man was free and the master
o f his own castle. Thus, for a government to intrude upon that man’ s home or his liberty
meant that the government was intruding into that man’ s personal privacy realm.
A t the birth o f this country, the colonials, who had lived in oppression under British
rule and had suffered from the exploitation delivered through the hands o f the British
soldiers, sought to make their new government less intrusive and controlling. (Scott 1995.
42-43) Consequently, the tone o f the Constitution, coupled with the new idea o f
federalism, began to shape this new nation. However, it was the combination o f the
Constitution and its amendments as well as the topography of the country that created an
early decentralized government and a less com munally oriented society, which sought
and revered individuality. Arguably, the amendments to the Constitution can be called
the chrysalis o f the privacy arguments that we hold today.
The 1850s brought forth the beginning o f actual documentation and awareness in the
realm o f emerging privacy rights. (Scott 1995, 37; Warren and Brandeis 1890, 207-210)
It was a time when rugged individualism clashed w ith traditional society’ s knowledge o f

the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress o f
grievances.”
“ No person shall be held to answer for capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
presentment or indictment o f a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the M ilitia , when in actual service in time o f War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy o f life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself, nor be deprived o f
life, liberty, or property, without due process o f law; nor shall private property be taken
fo r public use, without just compensation. ”
■' “ The enumeration in the Constitution, o f certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.”
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its neighbors." Advancements in technology sparked an increase in the output o f the
media. Prior to the C iv il War. there were few newspapers, prim arily due to the expense
o f producing them. However, w ith the development in new technologies, such as the
improvements in printing, photography and telegraphy, and the growing mass market of
new. ill-educated readers (immigrants), newspapers felt the need to meet the market’ s
demands. Between 1850 and 1890. the production o f newspapers in the larger cities shot
up from around 100 newspapers circulating to 800.000 readers a day. to approximately
900 urban papers with over 8 m illio n readers. (Scott 1995. 38)
The outcomes o f this new market were remarkable. Just about anyone w ho wished to
know about newsworthy inform ation could easily access it if he could read or have the
paper read to him. No longer did a person have to hear a garbled story by word o f mouth;
he could access the story through an assumed reliable source. Moreover, this new form
o f journalism, which resulted from the increase in papers, also provided entertainment for
the reader, presenting the news in a vivid and titillating way. This form soon came to be
known as yellow journalism.'^
As with all advancements in technology, the downside o f these advancements
allowed for the media to present pictures o f private citizens and public figures easier than

" Looking over the history o f humankind, traditional society stems from the idea that
humans, at one time, lived together fo r the benefits o f communal livin g that included
security, a sense o f belonging and an interdependency that included division o f labor
among the different members. In this society, being a member o f the group overrode any
sense o f the independent self, thus privacy was not an issue. One did not have secrets
from a neighbor. Even what would be considered private fam ily information today, such
as child rearing, was w ithin the traditional community’ s knowledge and interests. ( Scott
1995; DeCew 1997)
'■ The term yellow journalism o rig in a lly resulted from the newspapers’ yellowish tint,
but later became known for the type o f publication that focused on the upper echelon o f
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before. Soon blaring headlines and accompanying pictures sparked the
acknowledgement that there was a threat to privacy. For example, in the 1890 New York
case M arion Manola v. Stevens & M vers. “ a starlet who was appearing wearing tights in
a Broadway play became angry when tw o photographers secretly photographed her
during her performance, one with a flash. A fraid they would take her photo to the
newspapers, she sued to prevent them, and the New York Supreme Court agreeably
complied, by issuing an injunction.” (Scott 1995. 39) It was cases sim ilar to this one. as
well as the increasing aggressiveness and impropriety o f the media, that led to a ground
breaking article on privacy written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in the
December 15. 1890 Harvard Law Review.
In their article. “ The Right to Privacy.” Warren and Brandeis discussed how. at the
time, there was no clear conception o f privacy in American law. even though there had
been occasional references to the idea that people had the “ right to be let alone.” (Warren
and Brandeis 1890, 193) They drew the examples for their arguments from cases in
Britain and Ireland, as well as from philosophical arguments they conceived. They
argued that the legal system needed privacy torts so that people could seek justice and
compensation when their personal privacy was invaded. The v illa in throughout their
argument was the irresponsible press that had run wild. It was their view that people
living in this modem and complex life needed a “ retreat from the w orld” through privacy
and solitude. (Warren and Brandeis 1890. 196) But as a result o f the invasiveness o f the
press, they doubted this ability to achieve peace o f the soul or the private self. In the end.
they believed that the individual should have the ability to determine his or her own mind

individuals as w ell as the criminals o f the day. It was an eclectic m ix o f “ sin, sex and
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and to what degree he or she would communicate those thoughts to others. W hile most
people o f the time accepted this concept under a common law notion, Warren and
Brandeis solidified this principle in their argument, which would play an important role
in future Supreme Court cases.
The end o f the nineteenth century and the beginning o f the twentieth century brought
additional confrontations between the press and private citizens. Yet what few people
seemed to notice was the increasing intrusiveness o f the United States government,
especially in terms o f electronic surveillance. By the 1920s, government surveillance
became the new front in the battle against an individual's privacy. Eventually, this would
become a fight over the privacy rights implied in the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment states: “ The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
However, the government argued that as long as the surveillance did not invade or
intrude into a suspect’ s home, it had followed the letter o f the law. W hile the Supreme
Court did not always agree w ith the government on the issue o f intrusiveness, it would
not be until the 1960s that the Court would reprimand the government for violating an
in d ivid u a l’ s space."'*
The 1960s brought forth a plethora o f privacy dilemmas, ranging across an
in d ivid u a l’ s autonomy in decisions regarding her own reproductive system, government

violence” and fit today’ s view o f the news. (Scott 1995, 38)
■■* See Silverman v. United States. 365 U.S. 505 [I96 0].
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warrantless wiretapping, an in dividual’ s refusal to cut his hair, the rights o f high school
students, and the right to observe or read obscenity in the privacy o f one’ s own home.
(G ottfried 1994, 104-105) Some o f these issues, as discussed previously, had more to
do w ith an individual’ s autonomy and that o f the state’s interest. However, a growing
number had to do with emerging new technologies, which allowed for more government
intervention. In addition. American society was characterized by an increase in
antiestablishment political thinking which was reflected in the mid-1960s
counterculture. Furthermore, the explosion in surveillance technology not only came
from the government, but also from the private corporate sector. (Scott 1995, 53)
As society began to feel the emergence o f privacy rights, traditional monitors, such as
the fam ily, the education system, and religion started to erode. The social constraints and
relationships that once dictated the morals and feelings o f accountability to others no
longer mattered as much and the notion o f the individual began to root itself w ithin the
culture. As a result, the government began to grow, taking the place o f the traditional
behavior controlling mechanisms, and becoming the dom inating factor in deciding upon
acceptable behavior in society. For example, the government began to address issues
involving discrimination and the right to work, reproduction, abortion, copulation
between two consenting adults, and child labor to name a few. (Blank and M errick 1995)
In addition, once people began to isolate themselves as individuals from the group,
curiosity about information on those people that at one tim e m ight have been easy to
come by, rose. The outcome was an increase in the p u b lic’ s demand for information on
other people and in the behaviors o f those people, which, as discussed, were no longer
being monitored by traditional elements in society. Unfortunately this demand for
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knowledge on another's life has been one o f the contributing factors that have led to the
problems that people are facing today, such as the fascination with public figures' private
lives and problems. (Scott 1995, 54)

America’ s Constitutional Privacy
One o f the best methods for defining privacy and its history in America is seen in
numerous Supreme Court opinions throughout the years. The very first Court opinion on
personal privacy against governmental intrusion can be seen in the 1889 case o f Boyd v.
United States. This landmark case in privacy protection involved the im portation o f plate
glass and the lack o f duty payment by E. A. Boyd & Sons to customs as dictated by the
then current customs act. The district attorney, acting under the authorization o f the
customs act, obtained a court order for the invoices pertaining to the Boyds’ plate glass.
In response, the Boyds argued that the compulsory production o f their files violated their
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in respect to the prohibition o f unreasonable search
and seizures as well as their right to protect themselves from self-incrimination.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the B oyds’ argument with two justices
dissenting on the grounds o f the Court’s Fourth Amendment argument. Justice Joseph
Bradley for the Court opined that:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence o f constitutional
liberty and security. They reach further than the concrete form o f the case...they
apply to all invasions on the part o f the government and its employes [sic] o f the
sanctity o f a man’ s home and the privacies [sic] o f life. It is not the breaking o f his
doors, and the rummaging o f his drawers, that constitutes the essence o f the
offense: but it is the invasion o f his indefeasible right o f personal security, personal
liberty, [sic] and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his
conviction o f some public offense,- it is an invasion o f this sacred right which
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underlines and constitutes the essence o f [the] judgment. (Boyd and others.
Claimants, etc. v. United States 116 U.S. 532 [1886])
Yet it was not until the 1928 case o f Olmstead v. United States that the Court had a
chance to readdress the argument fo r personal privacy against government intrusion.
During this era, the United States had passed the National Prohibition Act. and Olmstead
was convicted o f the transporting and selling o f alcohol. He appealed to the Court on the
grounds that the evidence was illegally obtained through a wiretap. The C oun found that
privacy had not been invaded under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as Olmstead had
contended, since there was no physical invasion o f his house. Furthermore. C h ie f Justice
W illia m T aft held that conversations between two private individuals were not protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, for the moment, the Court upheld the government
wiretap. However, in one o f the most famous opinions on privacy ever w ritten. Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis' dissent stated;
The protection guaranteed...is much broader in scope. The makers o f our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit o f happiness.
They recognized the significance o f a man’ s spiritual nature, o f his feelings and o f his
intellect...They conferred as against the government, the right to be let alone- the
most comprehensive o f rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by government upon the privacy o f an
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed as a violation o f the
Fourth Amendment. (Olmstead v. United States 493 U.S. 572 [1928])
Despite Brandeis’ comment, the Court would continue to side with the government until
the passage o f the 1934 Federal Communications Act, which prohibited the interception
or retransmission o f any communication intercepted via wire or radio. (U.S. Public Law
416, Sec. 605)
Shortly after the passage o f the 1934 Federal Communications Act, the case o f
Nardone et al. v. United States began to change the definition o f privacy and the areas o f
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its protection. Frank Carmine Nardone and others, like Olmstead, were also convicted of
smuggling alcohol. Their dealings had been obtained through a wiretap via federal
officers. Nardone contended that the evidence procured by the federal officers' wiretap
was inadmissible due to the 1934 law. Justice Owen J. Roberts, w ritin g for the Court
stated: “ Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders should go
unwhipped o f justice than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive o f personal liberty...w iretapping by officers...involves
a grave w ro n g ."(Nardone et al v. United States 302 U.S. 277 [1937]) As a result, this
case became one o f many that would weaken the Olmstead decision and strengthen
arguments on personal privacy against government intrusion. However, the courts would
continue to hold, until 1967. that in wiretapping cases, the Fourth Amendment could be
applied only when there was physical entry and seizure o f tangible items. Overheard
conversations, at this point, were still unprotected.
By the 1960s. the adopted argument on privacy was that the right was a derivative o f
some o f the other constitutional rights, as pointed out in G risw old v. Connecticut. 381
U.S. 479 at 486 (1965). It was argued that these rights not only included property rights,
but also rights to “ bodily security,” w hich have very little to do w ith the people who are
not the main actors in a specific situation. (Decew 1997,46) As Justice W illiam O.
Douglas said in this case on contraceptives, “ [w]e deal w ith a rig h t o f privacy older than
the B ill o f Rights- older than our political parties, older than our school system. .It is an
association that promotes a way o f life, not causes; a harmony in livin g , not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.” (G risw old v. Connecticut.
381 U.S. 479 [1965]) Government must be lim ited in some realms, Douglas wrote, as the
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Supreme Court struck dow n the Connecticut law forbidding the counseling or use o f
contraceptives by anyone in the s ta te .W h ile this may have little to do w ith electronic
surveillance, this decision is important because it not only broadened the realm o f privacy
but also strengthened the base for this right. In this case, the holding rested upon the due
process clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as in the “ penumbra" o f privacy
interests protected in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.
The case that arguably overturned what little was le ft o f Olmstead was Katz v. United
Statesi 1967). Katz was convicted under an indictment that charged him with transmitting
wagering information through the telephone across state lines. This was a violation o f 18
U. S. C. 1084. Government agents had attached an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside o f his most frequented telephone booth and had proceeded to
document his unlawful transgressions. The Court held, as stated by Justice Potter
Stewart, that the Fourth Amendment is not to be translated as a general “ right to privacy."
The Amendment “ ...protects individual privacy against certain kinds o f governmental
intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with p riv a c y ...[it is
meant to) protect people, not places.” (Katz v United States 389 U.S. 350-351 [1967])
Moreover, he wrote that i f a person knowingly exposes inform ation to the public,
then it is not covered by the Fourth Amendment. “ But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected...[W ]hat he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding

However, the legitimate concern o f others can vary according to the circumstance
involved and the culture. For example, in the United States, a couple’ s decision about
whether or not they use contraceptives is beyond the concern o f others, yet in countries
such as China or India, this “ governmental intrusion ” or concern plays a legitimate role in
the population problems that they face today. (Decew 1997, 56)
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eye- it was the uninvited e a r..."(Katz v United States 389 U.S. 350-351 [1967])
Therefore, as Stewart contends, an individual who seeks privacy in a telephone booth
may rely upon the protection o f the Fourth Amendment. Once the person enters the
booth, shuts the door so as not to be overheard, and pays the toll, he or she is entitled to
the idea that whatever is said into the receiver w ill not be available to the w orld's
inquisitive ears. Hence the government agents ignored what Stewart called "the
procedure of antecedent ju stification.” which is instrumental in the Fourth Amendment.
(Katz V United States 389 U.S. 359 [1967]) This procedure is a required constitutional
precondition due to the type o f electronic surveillance that was used, as discussed at
length in a previous case.*” Since the surveillance in this case failed to meet the required
precondition, the case was reversed.
What resulted from this case was that the courts had significantly changed the
approach they use in determining whether or not searches and probable cause allowances
violated the nature o f the Fourth Amendment. This approach came to be known as the
privacy test. No longer were the physical boundaries o f the home the only area that was
private, but the conversations between individuals over the phone, regardless o f the
telephone’ s location, were covered as well, as long as the individuals sought privacy from
society.*^ In Justice John Harlan M arshall’ s concurring opinion, he discussed this two
pronged privacy test that the courts had developed loosely in relation to what locations
q ua lify as areas o f presumed privacy protection. The first requirement was that a person

■” This constitutional precondition is discussed more in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323. 330 [1966] (Katz v United States 389 U.S. 362 [1967])
This understanding o f privacy is not only lim ited to telephone conversations, but also
includes other aspects o f life, which would arguably be deemed more personal.
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had to exhibit an expectation o f privacy, even though it was a subjective expectation.
The second requirement was that society recognized this expectation as “ reasonable".
(Katz V United States 389 U.S. 361 [1967]) Some have contended that it is extremely
d ifficu lt to meet the first requirement, since the government can socialize its citizens on
the areas that can be considered private or it can manipulate the law surrounding areas
which could be deemed private by another society. The second requirement is just as
d ifficu lt in that it is subjective to the beliefs o f society or those who interpret those
belie fs- the government.
By 1968-1969. the government received a formidable blow for once again engaging
in improper electronic surveillance. In Alderman v. United States. Ivanov v. United
States, and Butenko v. United States, the petitioners were convicted o f conspiring to
transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce. They had discovered, after their
convictions and first appeals, that their place o f doing business in Chicago had been
subject to electronic surveillance by the government. The Supreme C ourt held that the
government was required to turn over all illegally obtained surveillance material to the
defendants, whose Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. As discussed in Katz,
the Fourth Amendment afforded privacy protections against the “ uninvited ear... .
[Therefore,] oral statements, i f illegally overheard, and their fruits are also subject to
suppression." (Alderm an et al v. United States 394 U.S. 171[1968]) The Court stated
that the suppression o f evidence obtained in violation o f the Fourth Amendment can be
only by those individuals whose rights were violated by the search."** Furthermore, after

■** “ In order to be a ‘ person aggrieved by an unlaw ful search and seizure’ one must have
been a victim o f a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as
distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use o f evidence gathered
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the defendants receive the illegally-obtained material, they have the right to examine the
information to determine what parts the government may use in building its case. This
allows the defendants to build a case challenging the information that the government
already has. W hile this seems unfair to the government, the objective was to allow only
official eavesdropping and wiretapping obtained through probable cause and a warrant.'^
"Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard o f the character o f its own existence.” (Alderman et al v. United
States 394 U.S. 202[1968])
Since the 1968 Alderman decision, the courts have wavered between the
government's right to know and that o f the individual’s right to privacy. The most recent
case, seen in 1998 in the district courts, is Tim othv R. McVeigh v. W illia m S. Cohen, et
al.'” Tim othy M cVeigh was a highly decorated noncommissioned o ffice r who was the
highest- ranking enlisted person aboard the USS Chicago, a nuclear submarine. On
September 2. 1997. a civilian Navy volunteer received an electronic m ail message via the
America O nline Service Provider (A O L ) regarding a toy drive that she was coordinating
for the submarine crew ’s children. She noticed that the message box stated that the email had originated from the alias "boysrch, ” but the text was signed "T im .”

Using the

"member p ro file directory” option on A O L , she discovered that the subscriber was
named T im , lived in Honolulu, Hawaii, worked in the m ilitary, and identified his marital

as a consequence o f a search or seizure directed at someone else...” (Alderman et al v.
United States 394 U.S. 173(1968])
■'* “ In 1979, ...the Court held that because Congress must have recognized that most
electronic bugs can be installed only by agents who secretly entered the premises,
warrants authorizing such surveillance need not explicitly authorize covert entry.”
(Biskupic and W itt 1997, 588)
Timothy M cV eigh is no relation to the convicted Oklahoma C ity bomber.
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status as homosexual. Included in this profile were his listings o f favorite activities,
which included "collecting pics o f other young studs” and “ boywatching.” What the
profile lacked were his fu ll name, address, and phone number. A fter discovering this
information, the volunteer proceeded to forward this inform ation to her husband, who
w as also a noncommissioned officer aboard the USS Chicago. Eventually, this material
found its way to the captain o f the ship, who was M cV eigh’ s commanding officer. A t
this point, the ship’ s legal advisor was called in to investigate suspicions that Tim othy
McVeigh was in fact the "T im ” listed under "boysrch.” Formal investigations began, and
the investigator instructed a paralegal assistant to contact Am erica Online to get account
information on the identity o f “ boysrch.” W ithout identifying him self or providing a
warrant, the assistant led the A O L representative to believe that he was an associate o f
M cVeigh’ s, and that he was follow ing up on a previously sent fax from the company, and
needed verification o f the handle “ boysrch.” The A O L representative identified the
handle to be Tim othy M cV eigh. McVeigh was then inform ed that he had violated the
m ilita iy ’ s policy o f “ D o n’ t Ask. Don’ t Tell, Don’ t Pursue.” *' The Navy conducted an
administrative discharge hearing, using the e-mail as its major form o f evidence. The
decision ordered M cV e ig h ’ s discharge from the Navy, but the day prior to his discharge,
he filed suit to win an injunction from the district coun to block the discharge. (Tim othv

■*' The “ Don’ t Ask, Don’ t T ell, D on’ t Pursue ” policy was created under the National
Defense Authorization A c t o f 1994. This policy applied to homosexuals serving in the
m ilitary. This policy was the result o f a political compromise, which allowed
homosexuals to continue serving in the m ilitary as long as they did not disclose their
sexual orientation to any person. In return, the m ilitary w ould not go out o f its way to
seek out. and discharge, homosexuals. ( Timothv R. M cVeigh v. W illiam S. Cohen, et
al.. C ivil Action 98-116, United States District Court for the D istrict o f Columbia 1998)
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R. M cVeigh v. W illia m S. Cohen, et al.. C iv il A ction 98-116, United States District
Court for the D istrict o f Columbia 1-3 [19981)
The district court found that M cVeigh’s anonymous e-mail was not an admission that
should trigger an investigation under this policy. Furthermore, Judge Stanley Sporkin
held that the Navy had violated the Electronic Communications Privacy A ct o f 1986 [18
u s e . §§ 2073(b) (A )-(B ). (c )(1 ) (b)]. He wrote that the Electronic Communications
Privacy .Act (ECPA) declares that government can obtain information from an ISP. “ only
i f a) it obtains a warrant issued under the Federal Rules o f Crim inal Procedure or state
equivalent; or b) it gives prior notice to the online subscriber and then issues a subpoena
or receives a court order authorizing disclosure o f the inform ation in question. ” (Tim othv
R. McVeigh v. W illia m S. Cohen, et al.. C ivil A ctio n 98-116. United States District
Court for the D istrict o f Columbia 4-5 [1998]) In this particular case, the Navy had failed
to comply w ith either o f these procedures. Moreover, Sporkin asserted that the
government knew o r should have known that A O L was breaking the law by turning over
the information w ith o u t a warrant, despite the fact the Navy solicited the information.
Accordingly. M c V e ig h ’ s injunction was granted.
W hile this case does not address whether the “ D on’ t Ask, Don’ t Tell, D on’ t Pursue ”
policy is constitutional, it does address a privacy issue. Not only does it affirm the ECPA
and the privacy rights o f users on all ISPs, but it also reinforces the Supreme Court’ s
decision in Alderman stating that “ information obtained improperly can be suppressed
where an individual’ s rights have been violated. In these days o f big brother,’ where
through technology and otherwise the privacy interests o f individuals from all walks o f
life are being ignored or marginalized, it is imperative that statutes explicitly protecting
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these rights be obseiwed.” (Tim othv R. McVeigh v. W illiam S. Cohen, et al.. C ivil Action
98-116. United States D istrict Court for the District o f Columbia.5 [1998])
O f course, over the twentieth century there have been several more cases in the coun
system that continued to expand and redefine privacy in respect to electronic
surveillance.*' The main conclusion one arrives at is the C ourt's sanction against
government intrusion in a new technological realm. Furthermore, the Court's
disapproval o f the invasion o f privacy using technological advancements has been seen
over and over in many o f these cases. In fact, one could argue that the courts would turn
a blind eye to some undesirable actions, as long as the constitutional right o f privacy for
those prosecuted were not infringed upon. However, while courts have tended to hold a
broad privacy position, especially in respect to the Fourth and F ifth Amendments.
Congress and executive agencies have begun in their own ways to chip away and
redefine, as well as violate, the courts’ privacy decisions.

*'Such examples include, but are not lim ited to the follow ing cases: United States of
.America v. Jake Baker and A rth u r Gonda CR95-80106 [1995], and United States of
America v. Robert Alan Thomas and Carleen Thomas C iv il Action 94-6648 & 94-6649,
U.S. Court o f Appeals [1996]. ( See Footnote 34 for more examples)
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CHAPTER I II

UN C LE SAM LEG ISLATES
As discussed in Chapter Two. over the years the federal court system established
groundbreaking precedents in the controversial realm o f government intrusion versus
citizens' rights.*'’ W hile the federal courts have defined the boundaries o f privacy in
terms o f government involvement and the “ right to be left alone” (Warren and Brandeis
1890. 193). the legislature has found d ifficu lty creating law that balances the Supreme
C ourt’ s decisions and those o f the state's police and intelligence surveillance interests.
This chapter w ill examine the legislature’ s attempt at integrating these two opposing
interests and discuss the legislative protection o f privacy and its implications or effects in
the realm o f cyberspace.

Privacy in the Legislature
The realm o f privacy in an era o f advanced technology was not addressed in the
United States Congress until the early part o f the twentieth century. One reason the

** W hile this argument tends to deal with privacy in the aspect o f information about one’ s
self, government intrusion, and eventually the relation to the Internet, there are many
other aspects o f privacy that do not relate to electronic surveillance or the Internet.
Unfortunately some o f those cases were not decided in the interests o f the person’s
privacy interests, i.e., C alifornia Banker’ s Association v. Schulz (1974), United States v.
M ille r (1976). O liver v. United States (1984), Bowers v. H ardw ick (1986). California v.
Greenwood ( 1988), O ’Connor v. Ortega ( 1987), and Florida v. R ilev ( 1989).
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Congress began to address privacy, as stated in Chapter T w o, resulted from the tensions
between society’ s dim inishing role as a behavior-m odifying agent, the rise in the
individual’ s sense o f self, and the government’ s emerging role as the new moral
•ontrolling mechanism. In traditional society, privacy was not an issue simply due to the
• involvement in the community overrode those interests o f the self. A person was
far more interested in being involved in the community fo r safety or security reasons, as
well as for social interactions w ith others, such as to reproduce. Therefore, the whole
community was aware o f almost every aspect o f a person. M any characteristics about a
person and much o f that person’ s history were com m unity knowledge. Today, many
American citizens would deem this previous com munity knowledge as infringements
upon an in dividual’ s private life. However, it would not be until the population increase
in migration to larger cities took place that the emergence o f personal privacy realms
would come to exist.
In America, not only did immigration to the cities lead to increased awareness o f
privacy, due to the a b ility to become anonymous and therefore private, but also as many
Americans began to move west, the societal pressures o f traditional communal
environments began to lessen. In short, neighbors knew less o f one another due to their
physical separation from the community by large tracts o f land. This increase in a lack o f
knowledge about one’ s neighbor, as well as advocating the privacy o f the individual, in
fact intensified the concepts o f personal privacy and their breaches under the increasing
intrusions committed by the growing media and inquisitive law enforcement bodies.
Legal remedies for the offended would begin to take shape once the courts began to act in
this area where the Congress would not.
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One o f the first laws to be created in protecting new technology and the citizens' right
to privacy against government intrusion was the Communications Act o f 1934.*'* The
original intent o f this statute was to regulate interstate and foreign communications that
traveled by radio wave or through cables/ wire (i.e., the telephone). As discussed in
section 4 o f the law, the newly established regulating body became known as the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). The law also discusses the licensing o f radio
communications and transmissions (Title III), FCC's jurisdictio n, government owned
stations and those o f foreign vessels, and the allocation o f facilities. Furthermore,
provisions for antitrust violations, establishing lotteries and announcements over the air
waves, operating and construction permits, distress signals and communications.
censorship and indecent language.** the employees o f a communication facility, third
parties, and the government are addressed as well.
The most im portant aspect o f this law. in terms o f protected privacy for
communication such as the Internet, is section 605. This section discusses the
unauthorized publication o f communications. It e x p lic itly states that:
No person receiving...any interstate or foreign com m unication...shall divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance...or meaning thereof...to any other person
other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney.. .or in response to a subpoena issued
by a court o f competent jurisdiction... [M oreover,] no person not being authorized by
the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance... or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.
(U.S. Public Law No. 416 Sec. 605)

This law is known as U.S. Public Law No. 416
**’ In respect to some free speech advocates who argue against the Communications Act.
section 326 o f this act supports many o f their arguments stating that “ [n]othing in this Act
shall be understood o r construed to give the Commission power o f censorship over the
radio communications o r signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall... interfere with the right o f free speech by means o f radio
communication.” Unfortunately it also gives the provision that no person can utter
obscene, indecent, or profane language over the radio.
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In this excerpt, “ person” is defined as an individual, an association, a corporation, or a
trust. However, in its implication, as used by the courts in Nardone et al v. United States.
a person can also be a government agent. Thus the actual meaning o f the law implies that
the government, as a third party, cannot interfere with or intercept a private
communication between two individuals over a telephone line. As stated in Nardone. the
plain words o f this section forbid anyone who is not the sender or the sender’ s authorized
person to intercept or divulge a communication that took place over the telephone lines.
One can argue about the meaning o f this law in relation to its applicability to law
enforcement officials, as interpreted in Nardone. However, the question o f whether
Congress meant to include the government and its right to protect the nation is debatable.
The two questions at hand that involve this law are whether the sovereign is deprived o f a
recognized or established principle or prerogative i f this act includes them, or whether it
im plied that the sovereign or its officials are excluded from the language o f the law that
embraces all people regardless o f occupation. Today, as in the late 1930s. one can look
at the history o f Congress to decide their intent. Even though the members o f Congress
had realized that the language neglected to be specific in matters concerning the
government’ s interception, one can see that they sought to remedy the situation by
introducing bills that would lim it the government and its agents’ use o f wiretapping for
crim inal convictions. (Nardone et al v. United States 302 U.S. 276 11937]) W hile none
o f the amendments to the b ill ever mustered enough support to change the document, the
realization by many members o f Congress and the numerous attempted corrections o f that
mistake was made enough times for the courts to make judgment on this issue.
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In respect to the Internet, this law establishes protection against government
monitoring o f e-mail, Internet surfing, and Internet phone calls. However, because o f the
dial-up process and the need fo r an ISP in order to access the Internet, this law does not
forbid employees o f ISPs from viewing a patron’ s e-mail or the detailed layout o f web
pages visited. The reason, located in Sec. 605, behind this employee access are the
exemptions concerning the. “ assisting o f receiving" or “ assisting o f transmitting"
communication phrases. Furthermore, in later privacy cases against employers,
employees found that this clause also permitted managers to view their e-mails since it
involved an aspect o f the employees’ work performance and production. (Aiana Shoars v.
Epson America. Inc.. No. B 073234. Los Angeles Superior Court. [1990]) The main issue
to understand, though, is that third parties not related to the transm itting or receiving o f a
certain communication, cannot view private communications o r access them. As seen in
earlier judicial decisions, this plays a major role in the government's ability to intrude
upon an in dividual’ s right to Internet privacy.
The Communications Act o f 1934, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, can be seen
as the groundwork in privacy legislation for the Internet. However some critics, e.g..
organizations such as the Ethical Spectacle and the Center fo r Democracy and
Technology, have argued that it is by far one of the worst w ritten laws, as discussed in
articles such as “ The Communications Act o f 1934 Was a M istake.” (Ethical Spectacle
1996. I) However, most o f their criticism is against section 326 o f the law, which
discusses censorship and indecent language. It states in two sentences that the FCC
cannot censor anyone, yet no one can utter any “ obscene, indecent or profane language
by means o f radio communication.” (U.S. Public Law No. 416 Sec. 326) In respect to the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40
Internet, one could argue that the FCC, as a government established body, could invade a
Netizen’s right to privacy, through the interception o f e-mail only for the sake o f
enforcing the obscenity clause o f section 326. In addition the amendments made to the
Communications Act o f 1934 by the Communications Decency Act are the main points
o f contention seen in today’ s freedom o f speech arguments.
As seen im p licitly in the previous chapter through the increase in ju d icia l activity, in
the late 1960s. there was a growth in government surveillance techniques, as well as
government intervention in what could be termed as private realms.*” W ith the courts
favoring personal privacy over government intervention, the Congress and the public
became increasingly aware o f law enforcement’ s use o f electronic surveillance
techniques. In addition, the Communications Act o f 1934 did not cover all privacy
interests. Congress later felt that the federal collection, use, and dissemination o f
personal information affected the privacy o f the individual citizens. Coupled w ith the
increasing use o f computers and new technology, not to mention the possible misuses o f
that information, they believed that citizens faced an increased harm, and that their
protections were in danger.
As a result. Congress passed the Privacy Act o f 1974, also referred to as Public Law
93-579. Embodied in this act were the 1964 Freedom o f Inform ation A ct’ s principles and
the 1972 Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems to the Secretary o f
the Department o f Health, Education, and W elfare’ s response to the public’ s and the
legislature’s concern that the government was turning into “ B ig Brother. ” The committee

*” See footnote 33 fo r other government intrusions, as w ell as Tim othv R. M cVeigh v.
W illia m S. Cohen, et al.. C iv il Action 98-116, U.S. D istrict Court for the D istrict o f
Columbia [1998]
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suggested five principles that it believed would protect privacy from Big Brother and the
developing little brothers in this new inform ation age.*’ These principles state that:
There must be no data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret. There
must [also] be a way for an individual to find out what information about him/her is
on record and how it is used. [Moreover, there] must be a way to correct or amend a
record o f identifiable information about him/her. [Additionally, there] must be a way
for an individual to prevent information about him / her that was obtained for one
purpose from being used or made available fo r other purposes without his/her
consent. [And fin a lly, any] organization creating, maintaining, using, or
disseminating records o f identifiable personal data must guarantee the re lia b ility o f
the data for their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse.
(Henderson 1999, 19)
Eventually these five principles would also be the foundation for the Electronic Privacy
Act o f 1986.
In the Privacy Act o f 1974, not only was the purpose o f the act to protect the five
principles mentioned before, but also to allow for a sixth principle which stated that there
had to be a way for a person to bring c ivil suit fo r any damages incurred as a result o f
w illfu l or intentional actions. (U.S. Public Law 93-579.42-43) Consequently the act
provided for the accountability o f federal agencies and private corporations on certain
disclosures, the accessibility o f records, federal agency requirements and rules, c iv il
remedies, and crim inal penalties and exemptions. The act also went so far as to cover the
actions or rights o f legal guardians, archival records, m ailing lists, and sanctions against
the government. Unfortunately, while the citizen's privacy became more protected from
the federal government, the act still neglected to cover the privacy rights guaranteed from

*’ L ittle brothers are corporations or companies who collect data on individuals for
business uses. Eventually, this data would be collected, sold, or exchanged to other
companies, who could in turn keep extensive dossiers on an individual’ s personal life,
knowing their shopping preferences, taste in food, their yearly income, and what they
owned. (Henderson 1999, 19)
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private corporations as seen in section 5. subsection 522a (m) (2). (U.S. Public Law 93579. 50)
W hile this act in itia lly sought to help citizens learn about the inform ation
collected on them and how to correct and protect that information, many critics, such as
the American C iv il Liberties Union (A C L U ). have found this act useless due to poor
implementation and the lack o f enforcement. Furthermore, problems w ith the act are
exacerbated since there were no appropriated funds for the enforcement o f provisions
relating to privacy. As a result, most government agencies did not bother to appoint
people to oversee privacy implementation. The O ffice o f Management and Budget
(0 M B ). which o riginally was appointed this task o f privacy enforcement because no
other agency w ould volunteer to act as the enforcing agency, found it could not fu lfill the
required enforcement in conjunction with its other duties. After privacy enforcement by
the 0 M B failed, no other federal agency volunteered to become the enforcer for privacy.
Thus, without the enforcing bodies to define the terms o f the law and penalize lack o f
compliance, agencies became their own judges o f whether or not they fu lfille d the
requirements o f the law correctly. (Strum 1998, 159-154)
Nevertheless, some critics, such as Harry Henderson, still contend that, while
cumbersome, the Privacy Act o f 1974 does provide citizens with legal remedies should
they suspect the government has inappropriate or inaccurate information about them, or
has distributed that information maliciously. That person need only determine which
agency has the inform ation and then request it. The only exceptions to their inquiries on
their own inform ation would be files located in law enforcement agencies or intelligence
agencies. (Henderson 1999, 33)
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Following the 1974 Privacy Act_and the Freedom o f Inform ation Act, there was a
plethora o f privacy legislation that was passed in the 1980s. One o f the first pieces o f
legislation was dubbed the Privacy Protection A ct o f 1980.^* T his act stipulates when
searches are authorized, as w ell as who is allowed to perform them.^^ The prominent
themes in this document are the requirement o f warrants and the principles o f the 4“’
.Amendment. In essence, law enforcement cannot perform searches or seize any “ work
product" or “ documentary m aterial" without a warrant. (U.S. Public Law 96-440, section
42 U. S. C. 2000aa (a)- 2(XX)aa-l 1 (a) (4) 95-99)

Materials can be seized only i f there is

probable cause to believe that the person possessing the m aterial is involved in a crime
and the material is evidence o f this crime or may relate to national security. This
includes materials intended for publication by journalists and publishers in the
preparation o f newspapers, broadcasts, books, and other types o f public communications.
In addition, this act forces law enforcement to utilize subpoenas and citizen
cooperation to obtain evidence in respect to First Amendment activities. As in previous
acts, this statute also provides fo r legal compensation for damages should a government
agent, follow ing the orders o f his/her agency, violate any portion o f this law and wrongly
seize an item or search an area. The im plication provided in this body o f work is that
protection o f private documents or inform ation can extend to materials intended for
publication on online systems as w ell as electronic bulletin board systems (BBS).
One criticism o f this act relates to section 2000aa-12. This section discusses the
binding nature o f the guidelines discussed in the b ill, as w ell as disciplinary action and

Also known as U.S. Public Law 96-440.
O nly those involved in the investigation can do the searching and i f need be the seizing
o f items.
39
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the legal process fo r noncompliance with the law. In two rather long sentences that seem
to contradict the earlier provision in section 2000aa-6, it states that the violation o f the
guidelines would subject an employee or an officer only to administrative disciplinary
action. Furthermore, i f the issue is related to compliance or the failure to comply, there
can be no litigation, and the court cannot suppress or exclude evidence. What one could
argue is that, hypothetically, i f an enterprising officer, who fails to obtain a warrant,
decides to seize inform ation due to his concern that i f he did not there might be a breach
o f national security or someone would incur bodily harm, the victim o f his search could
not bring legal suit against the officer for seizure o f his/her items. Moreover, i f the
officer is correct in his assumptions, he might receive slight disciplinary action, such as a
verbal warning, but cannot be held crim inally or c iv illy liable. However, the agency can
be held liable depending upon the violation.
W hile one could argue the slippery slope implications o f this provision and how, in
the wrong hands, the government would not be held accountable for much, this act has in
fact helped some victim s reclaim seized items from the government. In the case o f Steve
Jackson Games. Inc. v. United States Secret Service, the Secret Service organized an
investigation into the hacker group called the “ Legion o f Doom.” Their belief was that
the organization had stolen confidential inform ation about the emergency Bell South 911phone system, which was actually available to the public for a few dollars, compliments
o f the Freedom o f Inform ation Act. Through much guesswork in their investigative
processes, the Secret Service falsely assumed a computer BBS game system known as the
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“ Illu m in a ti” was connected with another BBS, called the “ Phoenix.” '**’ They believed the
operator o f the “ Phoenix” BBS, Lloyd Blankenship, was an associate o f the Legion o f
Doom, because the site happened to have the “ confidential” manual on its board for
downloading. They connected the “ Illu m in a ti,” which was owned and operated by Steve
Jackson Games, to the “ Phoenix” BBS through Blankenship, who happened to be an
employee o f Steve Jackson Games. (Henderson 1999, 77)
On March 1, 1990, the Secret Service raided Steve Jackson Games and confiscated
thousands o f computer disks. In addition, they seized all computer equipment and files
used by the company. The agents believed they struck pay dirt when they uncovered an
alleged “ how-to" manual for computer crim inals. In actuality, the document in question
was a rule book for a role-playing game that was being developed around the idea o f a
futuristic high tech society. (Henderson 1999, 77; Center for Democracy and Technology
2001 . 1)

Steve Jackson repeatedly asked the Secret Service for the return o f his seized items,
after they had finished copying them, but the agency ignored his requests. His lack o f
business material for the game shop, which included the developed new games as well as
the role/ rule books fo r current ongoing games, eventually forced him into bankruptcy.
As a result Jackson sued the Secret Service. (Henderson 1999, 77)
The Texas D istrict court found that, under the Privacy Act, the Secret Service had
violated Jackson’ s rights. Furthermore, the judge noted, “ while the content o f these
publications are not sim ilar to those o f daily newspapers, news magazines, or other

This BBS did happen to have hacker-related conversation and material on it as well as
the Bell South 911 information.
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publications usually thought o f by this court as disseminating inform ation to the public,
these products come w ithin the literal language o f the Protection A c t." (Henderson 1999.
77) Jackson was awarded damages/* but the impact o f both the case and the act were
reflected in law enforcement’ s realization that privacy statutes, and First and Fourth
.Amendment rights had to be considered in the realm o f computer communications and
documents.
A small but significant and effective privacy act, which was bom in the 1980s. was
the Cable Communications Policy A ct o f 1984.*' The act protects subscriber privacy by
hindering cable operators or third parties from monitoring cable consumer buying and
viewing habits. Likewise, it prohibits the collection o f “ personally identifiable
inform ation" (P Il), unless authorized by the subscriber. (U.S. Public Law 98-549, section
47 U. S. C. § 551 (c) 101) The exceptions to this rule are i f the PH is needed in order to
render a service by the operator or the PH is needed to conduct legitim ate business
activity related to the service, for instance sending a bill. (U.S. Public Law 98-549,
section 47 U. S. C. § 551 (c) (2) (A ) 101) In addition the act places a heavy burden o f
proof on law enforcement agencies seeking court orders for consumer information. The
implications o f this b ill are that it w ill extend to the new online services provided by
cable companies, and that, eventually, this might allow for the protection o f an ISP’ s
members’ PH against government intrusion.
The end o f the 1980s brought the Electronic Communications and Privacy Act
(ECPA) o f 1986. The EC PA was an update to Title HI o f the Omnibus Crime Control

* ’ Unfortunately this case still is unresolved, since the appellate court reversed the
decision in favor o f the government. (Center for Democracy and Technology 2001, 1)
* ' Also referred to as U.S. Public Law 98-549.
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and Safe Street A ct o f 1968. O riginally, Title III o f the Omnibus b ill regulated the use of
government wiretaps and hidden microphones, requiring that the consent o f one party be
obtained prior to the tap and/ or that a court order be obtained. In addition, it prohibited
wiretapping o f employees by private parties or public investigators. Title III also
established a procedure that requires a warrant authorizing electronic surveillance and the
use o f wiretaps. W hile T itle I II protected aural communication transmitted through wire
or cables, it failed to protect e-m ail content as w ell as communications over cordless
telephones. Obviously this opened the door to unrestricted government electronic
surveillance on w ireless transmissions and non-aural communications such as e-mail and
faxes. (Strum 1998, 141-142)
As mentioned before, the ECPA was an update to T itle HI o f the Omnibus b ill. This
act not only protected previous communication technology, such as two-party phone
calls, but also provided protections for all new forms o f d ig ita l and computer
communications. This included communications via video, electronic transmissions, text,
data, and audio, which were all equated to that o f a phone conversation w ithin the home
or that o f first class mail.*^ Like the Communications A c t o f 1934, the ECPA included
protections against interception and disclosure o f communications. Furthermore, the
sanctions in the ECPA applied not only to the government, but also to private companies
and individuals as well. (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2511) A fte r the act became law.
government was required to obtain a court order or the p rio r consent o f one party before
initiating any electronic surveillance through a wiretap, whether accessing real time

This did not include cordless phones or tone only paging devices. (Strum 1999, 158;
Rubinstein 1999, 3)
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communications or stored messages. (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2511 (2) (a) - (b)
107-108) Restrictions against private companies were reflective o f the principles stated in
the Cable Communications Policy Act and the 1934 Communications Act. As in those
two previous acts, the only acceptable m onitoring o f communication by a third party,
such as the service provider, was for information received and distributed in the normal
course o f business for providing a specific service, such as some sort o f mechanical or
service quality control check. (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2512 (2) (a))
The advantages to the ECPA not only included those o f broader protections for a
growing realm o f communication technology, but it also clarified invasions o f privacy
and codified protections against those invasions, as seen in Tim othy R. M cVeigh v.
W illia m S. Cohen, et al. in Chapter Two. In addition it sought to curb government
surveillance and recreational eavesdropping, unless com mitted by an employee’ s
employer in respect to work e-mail or business telephone communications.
The largest criticism o f the ECPA came from the A C L U , which originally endorsed
the act, stating that it protected civil liberties. Yet since the signing of the act into law.
the ECPA has been ridiculed for its failure to protect and enforce certain electronic
communication procedures. Moreover, critics have pointed to key discrepancies between
the actual law and the original versions, which were promoted by civil libertarians.
(Rubinstein 1999, 3)
One main contention lies within section 2516, w hich lists a host of prosecutable
violations, including bribery, child pornography, counterfeiting, hacking inaccessible
inform ation and the transportation o f stolen property. A critic from The Nation called
this “ a wish list for the law-enforcement com m unity” (Rubinstein 1999, 3) Not only did
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the ECPA substantially increase the list o f federal crimes permitting the use o f
government electronic surveillance, but it also increased the number o f Justice
Department o fficials who can give judicial approval for court orders such as warrants.
(U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2516 (2))
Critics also argue that ECPA provisions regarding access to certain subscriber
information has been made easier for law enforcement agencies to obtain, since in certain
instances there is no provision for judicial review. Requests fo r customer records from
service providers need be accompanied only by a statement that certifies the information
requested pertains to an investigation that involves the interception o f foreign
intelligence. (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2511 (2) (e)- (f)) This easy accessibility
enhances arguments questioning the certifying procedures o f law enforcement officials
and service providers, since the original intention o f the ECPA was designed to protect
communications. (Rubinstein 1999, 3)
Some final criticism s o f the ECPA result from the revised definition o f “ content,”
which seems to exclude the existence o f “ communication,” as well as the identities o f the
parties involved in the transmission. (Rubinstein 1999, 3-4) The actual text defines
“ contents" as “ any inform ation concerning the substance, purport, or meaning o f that
communication.” (U.S. Public Law 99-508 Sec. 2510 (8)) However, the definition, as
the critic Geoffrey Rubinstein has pointed out, lacks what is the expression o f
communication between two parties. What this may mean is that there might be a closer
scrutiny of calling and e-m ail correspondence patterns. In addition, after September 11,
2001, Americans have seen an increase in specialized surveillance programs, such as
DCS 1000, discussed in Chapter One. One could argue that the ECPA’ s 2511 provision
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w ill eventually allow for fu ll government surveillance o f the populace, which would
include monitoring political groups, student action committees, and even communities.
To move further in the argument, even though government must apply fo r a wiretap in
order to have access to the substance o f a communication, a tap and trace would allow the
government to define invisible social networks and identify key members w ithin those
social groups.
In 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act. This act, resembling the
Cable Communications Policy Act o f 1984, dealt with the privacy o f customer
inform ation and FCC implementation. In general, the act states that every
telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the confidentiality o f inform ation, not
only relating to the customers, but also relating to other carriers and equipment
manufacturers. In addition, this act establishes provisions for the use o f information
received from other carriers, as well as the ability o f the carrier’ s agents to access
customer information. Tlie law ’ s im plications in the cyberworld w o u ld tend to protect
the information o f a user more securely than previous bills had. U nfortunately, this law
also grants carriers the ability to use telemarketing advertisements.
The most recent and arguably controversial law passed is the U n itin g and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (U SA PATRIO T A C T ) A ct o f 2001. This act was a response to the
terrorist actions committed against the United States on September 11, 2001. As the
nation grieved for the victim s in the airplane hijackings and crashes, this b ill, which was
initiated in the House o f Representatives, was quickly created, amended, and signed into
law w ithin a record five weeks, with only one dissent. The 345-page b ill makes changes
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to over 15 different statutes as well as providing analysis and explanation to sections of
the b ill relating to new technological developments and online communications and
activities. (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2(X)1, 1)
The b ill includes a plethora o f inform ation, such as some provisions that apply
directly to combating terrorism, w hile other provisions seem to create and enhance laws
governing the cyber-realm and regular non-terrorist activities. Such provisions include
creating a counterterrorism fund, increasing funds to the FBI, expanding a national
electronic crim e task force, enhancing surveillance procedures, strengthening criminal
laws against terrorism, and prosecuting international money laundering. Also mentioned
are techniques on counteracting terrorist financing, protecting the national borders,
establishing more stringent codes fo r immigration, removing "obstacles” in investigating
terrorism, providing for the victim s o f terrorist attacks, and im proving intelligence
capabilities in both national and foreign spheres. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56 2001.)
Perhaps one o f the most controversial aspects o f the b ill is that o f information sharing
between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, thus creating a centralized
law enforcement and intelligence body. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56 2001, Title V II;
Sec. 701)
W hile law and immigration agencies have lauded the b ill fo r unifying and increasing
facilities in an abundance o f fields, many critics, from the A C L U to online journalists and
scholars, have attacked the b ill for its confusing and intrusive language. Some critics,
such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, contend that Congress had failed to study the
b ill and that there was not sufficient time allotted to hear testimony from experts outside
the law enforcement field where the changes w ill definitely be felt. In addition, critics
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state that the government, which curbs some c iv il liberties in the law, failed to show that
the reason they could not detect the planning o f any terrorist acts stemmed from
compromising previous laws and court judgments that established citizens’ c iv il liberties.
(Electronic Frontier Foundation 2001, 2) Moreover, this legislation increases the power
o f the president and executive branch subordinates; at the same time it reduces the power
o f congressional oversight in conducting domestic as w ell as foreign wars. (Herman,
2001 2) The problem which arises is Congress’ s refusal to maintain an active role in the
oversight o f the executive agencies. This weakens the federal check on the executive
branch since the judiciary cannot make a decision u n til a controversy from this b ill is
brought forth to them.
Furthermore, in the surveillance provisions listed under Title II o f the law. there is a
decrease in ju d ic ia l oversight o f government surveillance, as well as a provision that
allows a judicial magistrate to issue a court order fo r law enforcement officials pertaining
to information outside his/ her district. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56 2001, T itle II; Sec.
215. Sec. 219) In essence, the surveillance provisions in the b ill resemble the standards
o f the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act o f 1978 (FIS A). Title 11. like FISA, allows
fo r the increase in surveillance o f activities, even when there is no probable cause. In
addition, according to T itle II, FISA warrants may now be used against citizens even if
the purpose o f the investigation is not to gather intelligence. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56
2001, Title II: Sec. 225) This allows for the extension o f nation-wide "roving wiretaps”
to be used on intelligence wiretaps, which are secretly authorized and do not need
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probable cause.** (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2(X)1, 3) The possible privacy issue is
whether or not a person being monitored, via electronic surveillance, w ill cause other
users o f that phone to be monitored. In addition, this law may restrict provisions created
in the Katz and Alderman decisions, such as the two-pronged privacy test and the
suppression o f evidence against individuals whose rights were violated.
Advantages in this act to the average citizen and Netizen are few. Congress did place
a sunset clause in Title II, section 224, o f the provision, but this applies only to parts of
the law. In Title II, only thirteen out o f tw enty-five provisions w ill expire on December
31, 2005. (U.S. Public Law No. 107-56 2(X)1. T itle II: Sec. 224) Those that w ill not
expire include the continued sharing of grand ju ry inform ation (section 203 a and c), the
increased number o f FISA judges (section 208), and the scope o f subpoenas for records
o f electronic communications, which overrides the Cable Communications Act in respect
to services offered by the providers (section 211). In addition, the m odifications for “ pen
and trap” (section 216), single jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism (section 219),
increased citizen assistance to law enforcement (section 222), and section 225 concerning
FISA wiretap immunities w ill not expire.
The main problems o f this b ill are staggering. Not only is the law incredibly difficult
to read for the average citizen, but one would need to go on a treasure hunt in order to
comprehend the im plications in the other laws that this act changes through amendments
and edited provisions. Moreover, as some critics argue, it is obvious that close
consideration o f this b ill was never taken. Section 217 o f T itle 11 o f the b ill contradicts

** Roving wiretaps are those wiretaps placed on all the phones that a specific person
utilizes.
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earlier amendments to the ECPA in section 203-(b) (6) (2) (B). In addition, it limits a
person's due process rights under section 223 o f Title II, and relieves the government o f
accountability through delayed warrants and amendments to the ECPA. There are
actually so many criticisms o f this b ill that it is surprising that Congress and the President
allowed it to pass with so many questionable passages and so little research.
O f course, as mentioned before, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have
found this b ill to be a boon to their previous information communication problems. The
new law strengthens a new C lA -F B I alliance in two ways. First, the C IA is explicitly
allowed to decide who w ill be targeted and the information to be retrieved on domestic
investigations. In addition, the C IA is given fu ll access to inform ation on citizens that
has been gathered by U.S. law enforcement agencies and grand juries. This might in turn
allow the FB I to launch investigations into dissident groups or on an individual suspect
whom they believe to have ties to terrorist or foreign intelligence agencies, no matter how
remote the connection may be. (Dreyfuss 2(X)2, 32)
Additional advantages may include the increased inform ation local and state law
enforcement agencies can now access through the FB I's Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTF). The JTTF and the USA P A TR IO T A C T may help these local law enforcement
agencies rebuild their intelligence units, so that they may have the ability to solve and
tackle local terrorist problems. The only issue that the Justice Department fears is state
and local agencies trampling the remaining privacy rights and c iv il liberties o f groups and
individuals who voice extreme political opinions. “ Precisely because terrorism is a
political crime, usually perpetrated by organizations w ith politica l agendas, antiterrorism
intelligence can often mean surveillance o f groups and individuals for their opinions and
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not their acts.” (Dreyfuss 2(X)2. 33) As a result, the monitoring o f political, racial,
religious, and special interests, such as those concerning the environment, w ill be key
factors in surveillance.
Through the development o f legislation from 1934 until 2001, communications
privacy has faced dramatic changes. Until the passage o f the 2001 US.A P A TR IO T .ACT.
one could almost assume that privacy protections on the Internet were moving more in
favor o f personal privacy over that o f government intrusion. Yet, with all violent actions,
one must assume an extreme reaction to take place. Unfortunately Congress’ s reactions
to the terrorist actions o f September 11, 2001 have proven to be less favorable to
Netizens' rights in cyberspace.
One hope to this outcome is that a case w ill present itself to the Supreme Court, and it
w ill declare the unconstitutionality o f this statute. W hile this seems unlikely, perhaps the
ability to assert ju d ic ia l power in the form o f ju d icia l review w ill tempt the justices to
once again take a leading ethical role in the United States, as they did w ith Brown v.
Board o f Education. The other hope would be that Congress would see the error o f this
law and repeal it before it allows grave injustices not only to American society, but also
to American Netizens. The last and most unlikely prospect w ill come from the American
voters. Perhaps Americans w ill see the error in this legislation and make demands to
rectify these privacy invasions by holding the government accountable, through either
their congressional representatives or their president. I f none o f these actions come to
pass, laws governing the cyberworld w ill not support the claims that some actions and
communications in this realm are protected. As a result, Netizens may find the right to
privacy a privilege allow ed more so than an established prerogative.
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CHAPTER IV

A NEW HOPE
Throughout this analysis, the clashes between the realm o f electronic privacy rights
and government's new crime solving applications have repeatedly turned up. The
creation and use o f programs such as DCS 1000, Echelon, and encryption keys are just
some methods that government can use to capture criminals. However, those same
programs, when placed in the hands o f an unchecked agency, can mean disaster to the
constitutional rights o f Americans. Shadows o f McCarthyism and images reminiscent of
those found in the movie “ Gattica” and James O rw ell’ s book Nineteen Eightv-Four creep
into the minds o f Americans. However, in the aftermath o f the September 11‘*' violence,
many Americans who at one time defended their privacy rights now condone the
government’ s intrusions, regardless o f whether those intrusions protect them against
harm in this integrated flesh and cyber-world. A t the end o f Chapter One, two questions
that this analysis focused on were raised. They are: “ Is there a protected constitutional
right to privacy [in respect to the Internet],” and i f so, "who or w hat w ill protect that
right?”
In answer to the first question, the United States Supreme Court has said that the
constitutional privacy rights o f the individual do exist on many levels, including the new
areas o f communications. In addition, the Court stated that government could not intrude
upon those privacy rights, even i f the right is exercised in a public area. Government’ s
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unwanted intrusion is a breach to one’s right to privacy, and should not be condoned
unless government can prove that there are sufficient reasons for encroaching upon the
citizen’s rights. Those reasons must be provocative enough to solicit a magistrate’s
concession to issue a court order such as in the investigation o f suspicious or illegal
activity or in the case o f a national security breach. However, victim s o f privacy
violations also have a burden to bear. Privacy does not encompass all aspects or realms
o f life. An individual must give up some autonomy when he or she enters into the social
and political realm o f society. The debate lies in where the realm o f privacy ends and the
realm o f public inform ation must begin. Those people seeking retribution for privacy
invasions must be able to prove that their expected private communications w ith another
individual took place in a location or realm that would be considered “ reasonably
private ” in the eyes o f society. (Katz v United States 389 U.S. 361 [1967])
For obvious reasons, the question o f "reasonably private ” areas versus not so private
areas needed to be addressed. As discussed in the third chapter. Congress assumed the
role o f defining what privacy rights should be expected in different areas, especially in
terms o f abstract, technology-created areas due to new innovations in computer
programming and mechanical engineering. U ntil the most recent USA PATRIO T ACT,
Congress had upheld and attempted to clarify ju dicial decisions upholding the privacy
rights o f an individual in the technological or abstract w orld. However, since the
enactment o f the USA P A T R IO T ACT. legislation upholding privacy rights has been
weakened, i f not dismantled.
As the courts and the legislature have maintained, there is a constitutional right to
privacy in respect to the Internet. The problem that now exists is how much privacy is
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protected on the Internet. As the end o f Chapter Three suggests, this question can be
answered only through the courts or the legislature. U n til either branch deigns to answer
this new dilemma, American Netizens can expect increasing problems and intrusions in
their daily cyber-relations with other Netizens.
In answering the second question of, “ who o r what w ill protect this right to privacy,”
•American citizens must look to a source other than themselves, since the U.S. courts have
not established communication privacy as being a real constitutional right instead o f an
instituted statutory right. In the evolution o f the Internet, it was discussed that the
removal o f government involvement caused a surge in cyber crime. U.S. privatized
industry could not adequately regulate the transgressions that took place and invaded the
personal privacy o f American users. In fact, most users were not sophisticated enough in
the protection o f their own privacy rights, which helped produce the current problems
that people face today in respect to cyber-stalking and identity theft. As a result, a cybergoveming agency and accompanying legislation must be created to protect the privacy
rights infringed upon by the government (through use o f the USA P A TR IO T A C T ) and
cybercriminals.
Possible policy proposals fo r the creation o f a new body and privacy protecting
legislation would need to entail four premises that w ill allow the law to be dynamic
enough that it may be interpreted to govern new innovations in technology over time.
The new law would also need to be applicable to the privacy problems encountered in the
cyber world. By the word applicable, it is meant that the law must be reasonable or must
encompass possible problems that could arise. Fanciful propositions would only
contribute to the edict’ s inability to mandate what would be considered legal and illegal.
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Moreover, the laws and the governing body would not only have to apply to the United
States, but also to an international audience, since the problems that are found on the
Internet not only apply to the United States but also are ones that affect all countries that
are linked to the Internet. Moreover, there needs to be a standard international law since
each country’ s statutes, including the United States', has failed to establish adequate
protection and institutions.
One o f the first conditions that must be established in this possible new policy would
be a universal provision that would be consented to by all countries, since one country’ s
enforcement o f laws w ill affect other Netizens around the globe. As it is, the current
problem w ith many privacy laws involving the W orld Wide Web is that countries believe
they can dictate their regulations to other countries’ users. This can currently be seen in
the Internet child pornography cases in Germany and the United Kingdom and their
dilemma in relation to extradition problems involving users who send illic it child
photographs from Singapore, which has loose child pornography laws. In addition, in
respect to remailers, many times foreign anonymous remailers have refused to release
users’ identities to foreign countries. What this currently implies is that, i f a hacker stalks
an individual or releases a computer virus through e-mail, there is no guarantee that the
hacker can be found and, if need be, extradited from a certain country. (M urphy 2001,
24-27)
However, i f a universal agreement between all countries exists, cyber criminals may
be held more accountable for their actions violating the privacy rights o f individuals in
other countries. The parties in a country that experienced the violation could address the
suspect without having to negotiate through the bureaucratic mazes o f the other
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countries’ extradition laws. Furthermore, as suggested in several European
recommendations and supports, by sharing the experience o f problems encountered over
the Internet, the various national authorities can work together to adopt a coherent
strategy for applying general principles on issues concerning data protection. (EU
Directive 1998, 2.1.1)
In addition, in order to effectively enforce privacy protections and cyber law
infringements, there must be a universally accepted governance body. A possible model
could be the International Atom ic Energy Agency (IA E A ). However, unlike the IAEA,
the proposed body would need the power to enforce legislation and pursue violators. The
United States’ Federal Trade Commission’ s Privacy Initiative Team also might be a
potential model; however, like the IA E A , it too does not have the political clout, and in
addition it lacks the initiative to take a firm stand on privacy policies, and so must also be
ruled out. (Long 1997, 107) Possible sanctions on countries that accept the agreement,
yet fail to implement local enforcement, could include trade sanctions and Internet
boycotts o f country originated sites. Perhaps even an extreme sanction might be an
Internet blackout towards the country.*^ However, one big problem w ith international
agencies is having adequate powers to enforce regulations and the accompanying
violations. Consequently, many Netizens feel that private industry regulation and
Netizen boycotts would be more effective. (Long 1997, 108) Yet as discussed, self-

In terms o f a “ blackout” this could mean one o f two things. Either the country’ s ISPs
are temporarily shut down, or all sites originating from that country are displayed as
negative and inactive. For example i f the background is white, it becomes black or gray
and the hypertext is neutralized.
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regulation is ineffective in today’ s world, and thus a state supported agency must be
created.
Secondly, while programs such as Echelon and DCS 1000 w ill probably never be shut
down, there must be another way to ensure the privacy o f law abiding Netizens while at
the same time pursuing illegal actions committed by cybercrim inals. A possible proposal
might be to secure a database with known “ hacker" or cybercrim inal trails.
Unfortunately, anonymity, which goes hand in hand w ith privacy on the web, needs to be
sacrificed when tracking known Internet-sophisticated computer felons so that other
Netizens’ privacy rights can be ensured.
Possible future im plications might be stricter stipulations on the use o f anonymous
remailers and the purchase o f encryption software. However, this provision would in no
way require companies to give the new agency all access keys to their encryption
software, nor would it provide that remailers furnish a complete list o f users to the
regulating body. Remailers could voluntarily offer a repeated offending user’ s name to
the agency, should the remailers or private companies deem the transgression meriting
punishment. An example o f some transgressions could be a self-replicating virus or an ebomb. Political speech, for example, would not be a punishable transgression but a
protected right in the cyber world. In respect to encryption software, registering the
purchaser at the time o f purchase may be a possible option, but not a requirement. One
main reason is that the purchaser could always acquire an encryption program somewhere
without registering him or herself, such as over the black market. Remember, the premise
o f encryption software is to protect private communications and so access to those
communications defeats the purpose o f the program. As a result, Netizens’ permission to
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law enforcement accessing personal encrypted messages should be supported over
legislation perm itting access to encrypted inform ation by law enforcement agencies.
In addition, there needs to be a universal standard o f what information can be deemed
"publicly accessible.” or "public information." One o f the problems Netizens face, as
seen in the M cVeigh case, is the easy access to personal inform ation, such as gender and
sexual preference. On some ISPs or BBSs, one's personal inform ation might also include
the last time a user logged on. his/her home address, phone number, and employer.
These particulars need to be inaccessible to the average Netizen. In addition, one's credit
information, medical history, and personal identification number or social security
number also need to be made unavailable. A ll this "personal inform ation" can be used to
persecute a person, harass individuals, or perform fraudulent activities against that
individual. Personal identity on the Internet must be protected by this agency since ISPs
and the U.S. government have failed to do so. Moreover, there have been initiatives in
the past that allow a user to "opt-out” or "opt-in” for advertisement requests as well as
privacy controls. (Long 1997, 108) Unfortunately, these too do not have an impact on a
user, who must become proactive and contact certain sites should they not want their
information or "clickstream ” to be sold or traded.*^
Finally, the agency should perform random ISP checks on personal privacy. The
philosophy behind random checks can be found in the retail w orld’ s "private shopper.”
The "private shopper” is an individual who inspects the quality o f service provided in an
average shopping experience. The experience usually begins once the shopper enters the

*** A clickstream is a marketeering software tool used to track areas o f cyberspace that
consumers click to w ith a mouse. This information received may include what web sites
were visited, the pages accessed, and the time spent on each page.
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door o f the fa cility, and ends after s/he completes a purchase and leaves the premises.
The shopper then rates his/ her experience, and notes areas needing improvement, or
areas/ actions that were neglected and/or violated the establishment's house rules. The
belief is that, through random checks, services can be upgraded and maintained. This
same philosophy can be applied to the ISPs. The premise is that random checks through
an ISP on an isolated individual user w ill prove whether measures are taken to establish
privacy controls allow ing the distribution o f m inim al personal inform ation. This may
lead to a decline in the information trading market and identity theft. Services that a
provider might offe r could include the distribution o f encryption software, identity
certification or d ig ita l signatures, and stringent privacy regulation. The goal is to lim it
the public’ s accessibility to any specific user’ s information, thus lim itin g the possibility
for a breach in security.
In the case o f extradition or prosecuting cyberfelons and unlawful intrusive
government agents, violators could be turned over to appropriate law enforcement
agencies by the international body for violating international cyber regulations as well as
country specific violations. There would be no differentiation between unlawful acts
committed by a Netizen and unlawful acts committed by a government agent. There
would be no requirement to extradite, but a country could request extradition i f it wished.
In addition, each country could include its accounts o f crimes committed against that
country by that individual or the government agency. The international agency would
enumerate all offenses and provide a detailed list o f all violations a suspect user
committed. .After being tried by a judicial committee for all crimes, the international
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agency w ill issue a punishment fo r those offenses the crim inal was found guilty o f
com m itting.

Perhaps this may seem like a naïve vision; however, the multistate-

delegated power would establish the agency’s global power in regulating and
adjudicating Internet crimes. This agency could be the next step past a body like the
United Nations, and could bring about whole new generation o f effective international
regulating bodies that supersede nation-state rules.

Conclusion
The Internet is a confusing and complicated world hidden beneath interactive
commercial ads and "net” lingo. Unmanageable for the providers and seemingly
unregulated, this virtual W ild West is slowly being tamed through governments’
interventions. Yet, as government attempts to civilize this savage realm, it encroaches
upon the privacy freedoms enjoyed by Netizens. American Netizens need to take a stand
against government sanctioned intrusions committed against their privacy. United States
courts have stated that there is a constitutional right to privacy fo r the communications
and interactions in which Netizens partake. However, members o f Congress are afraid to
defend the right to privacy as a result o f fears elicited from recent acts o f violence.
The USA PATRIOT AC T is a disservice to the previous expanding cyber-privacy
protections. This act needs to be reexamined by the Congress and the Supreme Court to
either amend or repeal it. Its sanctions against criminal behavior cripple the electronic
privacy rights that have just recently begun to make sense, and yet the act fails to apply

*' This ju d ic ia l panel might be compromised o f the United Nations High Court, or it may
entail ju d icia l figures, chosen by each country governed by the cyber agency, which
rotate every so many years.
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s trictly to terrorism, as some would purport it does. As a result o f national agencies'
overreactions to foreign and domestic violence, there is a need to create an unbiased
international agency to protect the right o f privacy that many western countries around
the world profess to uphold. W ithout a regulating agency, there w ill be no body to
sanction the mansgressions that governments' law enforcement and intelligence agencies
com m it.
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APPENDIX I

P R IV A C Y A M EN D M EN TS IN TH E
U.S. C O N STITU TIO N
Amendment I
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment o f religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom o f speech, o r o f the press; or the right o f
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress o f

In privacy rights, this Amendment is commonly used to refer to the aspect o f freedom o f
speech and the freedom o f association.
Amendment 111
"N o soldier shall, in time o f peace be quartered in any house, without the consent o f the
Owner, nor in time o f war. but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”
This amendment has been used in conjunction with the 4'*’ Amendment to argue the rights
o f a citizen over that o f the state, when it involves actions committed in one’ s own home.
Amendment IV
"The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
The 4'*’ Amendment has been used to define the rights o f citizens and the areas o f
protection for tangible and nontangible items. Some protected privacy zones are
conversations, the right to read or view pornographic material, prophylactic rights
between two consenting adults o f different sexes, rights to contraception, the right to
beget a child, and the termination o f pregnancy.
Amendment V
"N o person shall be held to answer fo r capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
presentment or indictment o f a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the M ilitia , when in actual service in time o f W ar or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy o f life or lim b; nor
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shall be compelled in any crim inal case to be witness against himself, nor be deprived o f
life, liberty, or property, without due process o f law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use. w ithout just compensation.”
The 5'*' Amendment has been used to protect conversations and correspondence between
two people as w ell as documents from a person, which would implicate him/her in a court
o f law.
Amendment IX
"The enumeration in the Constitution, o f certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”
Often called the "catch all” amendment, the 9'*’ Amendment has been used in conjunction
with other amendments to protect privacy rights not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution.
Amendment X IV . section 1
" A ll persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens o f the United States and o f the state wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities o f citizens
o f the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person o f life, liberty, or property,
without due process o f law; nor deny to any person w ith in its jurisdiction the equal
protection o f the laws.”
The 14'*’ Amendment protects the right o f due process for each citizen o f the United
States. This amendment has been used in the privacy realm o f reproductive or
contraceptive rights. In addition, it has been used in other arguments such the right to
die. However, euthanasia has not yet been able to find a stable and favorable decision in
the courts in protecting the right to terminate one’ s own life.
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A P P E N D I X III

R E LATED IN TER N ET W EBSITES
For information on Carnivore, check out the follow ing sites:
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/camivore/camivore2.htm
http://www.msnbc.com/news/477749.asp
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/foia_documents.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/jud_comm.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/kerr_letter.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/army.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/test_6_00.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/projects.html
http://wwv/.epic.org/privacy/camivore/deployments.html
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/omnivoreproposal.html
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